peripheral to John's aim of excluding the pope and clergy from direct participation in temporal affairs 4 ' This essay will analyze John of Paris' use of the populus in his theory of kingship. John's conceptions of the relations between the two powers, and of the internal structure of the ecclesia, will enter the discussion only in so far as they illuminate some aspect of his monarchical thought. It will be shown that John of Paris was no exception to the tendency, in theory and in fact, towards royal authoritarianism in late thirteenth-century France.
It must be stated at the outset that John of Paris' principal concern in the De potestate is neither kingship as such, nor the autonomous status of the French realm in the whole ecclesia5. John uses these considerations primarily to clarify his analysis of the origin and nature of ecclesiastical authority. John attempts to make the pope and the clergy more responsible to the collective church by emphasizing the elective function of the community and its right and duty to depose an erring pope. John's system revolves on a sequence of analogies between the temporal and spiritual powers. These powers are defined metaphysically, and also in terms of the tangible interworkings between popes and princes who are both the "reflections" of the two orders of reality, nature and grace. Since the pope derives his authority from the total church, the latter, represented by a general council or the college of cardinals, can withdraw its power when the head ceases to function properly. If the pope is "elected" by the faithful, the prince must also be "elected" by the inhabitants of the principality. This framework of analogous relationships is second nature to a disciple of Aquinas whose metaphysics rests on a philosophical notion of analogy.
In contrast to his ecclesiastical interests, John of Paris quickly passes over political questions per se. A full twenty-one of the twenty-five chapters in the tract are devoted to the general problem of papal or clerical jurisdiction in spiritual and temporal affairs, while only four deal with matters not touching directly on spiritual-temporal relations, e.g., why the existence of many lay governments is preferable to a world monarchy (Chapter III). A single chapter, the first, is restricted almost entirely to the nature of the secular 
